TY - JOUR
T1 - Spanning our differences
T2 - Moral psychology, physician beliefs, and the practice of medicine
AU - Antiel, Ryan M.
AU - Humeniuk, Katherine M.
AU - Tilburt, Jon C.
N1 - Funding Information:
pre-doctoral fellowship support from the Mayo Clinic Program in Professionalism and Ethics. The investigators received valuable support in the design and implementation of the study from the Mayo Clinic Survey Research Center.
Funding Information:
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for very constructive and helpful comments to improve the quality of the paper. This publication was made possible by the Mayo Clinic Department of Medicine funding to Dr. Tilburt and from Grant Number 1 KL2 RR024151 from the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR), a component of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the NIH Roadmap for Medical Research. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official view of NCRR or NIH. Information on NCRR is available at http://www.ncrr. nih.gov/. Information on Reengineering the Clinical Research Enterprise can be obtained from http://nihroadmap.nih.gov. Dr. Antiel was supported by
Publisher Copyright:
© Antiel et al.
PY - 2014/11/4
Y1 - 2014/11/4
N2 - Moral pluralism is the norm in contemporary society. Even the best philosophical arguments rarely persuade moral opponents who differ at a foundational level. This has been vividly illustrated in contemporary debates in bioethics surrounding contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia. It is readily apparent that bioethics discourse lacks an empirical explanation for the broad differences about various topics in bioethics and health policy. In recent years, social and cognitive psychology has generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in moral intuitions generally. We propose that if empirical research using social intuitionist theory explains why people disagree with one another over moral issues, then the results of such research might help people debate their moral differences in a more constructive and civil manner. We illustrate the utility of social intuitionism with data from a national physician survey.
AB - Moral pluralism is the norm in contemporary society. Even the best philosophical arguments rarely persuade moral opponents who differ at a foundational level. This has been vividly illustrated in contemporary debates in bioethics surrounding contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia. It is readily apparent that bioethics discourse lacks an empirical explanation for the broad differences about various topics in bioethics and health policy. In recent years, social and cognitive psychology has generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in moral intuitions generally. We propose that if empirical research using social intuitionist theory explains why people disagree with one another over moral issues, then the results of such research might help people debate their moral differences in a more constructive and civil manner. We illustrate the utility of social intuitionism with data from a national physician survey.
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U2 - 10.1186/1747-5341-9-17
DO - 10.1186/1747-5341-9-17
M3 - Comment/debate
C2 - 25366256
AN - SCOPUS:84925295664
SN - 1747-5341
VL - 9
JO - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine
JF - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine
IS - 1
M1 - 17
ER -